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LABOR ARBITRATION AND THE CONCEPT
OF EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATION
BENJAMIN WYLE*
Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to
repeat it.
—George Santayana
The principles and practices of collective bargaining have evolved
during many decades, through negotiations between labor and man-
agement, through the day-by-day procedures of employee-employer
relationships, and through legislative acts and judicial decisions.
Resistance to the process has taken a variety of forms. The legal
argument of individual freedom of contract succeeded in blocking many
statutory advances over the years in the social and labor welfare field.'
The United States Supreme Court regarded such legislation as
unconstitutional upon the following rationale:
The right of a person to sell his labor upon such terms as
he deems proper is in its essence the same as the right of the
purchaser of labor to prescribe the conditions upon which he
will accept such labor from the person offering to sell . . . . In
all such particulars the employer and the employe have
equality of right and any legislation that disturbs that
equality is an arbitrary interference with the liberty of con-
tract which no government can legally justify in a free land. 2
When directly confronted with the problem, Congress has
recognized the workingman's handicap in seeking fair and equitable
* A.B., Columbia University, 1929; LL.B., Brooklyn Law School, 1932; Member,
New York Bar; Partner, Luxemburg & Wyle, New York City.
1 Morehead v. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936); Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261
U.S. 525 (1923); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); Coppage v. Kansas, 236
U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
2
 Id. at 174-75.
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terms of employment through individual dealings with his employer,
as well as the deleterious effects of such separate negotiations on the
national welfare. In the 1932 Norris-LaGuardia Act, Congress declared
that
. the individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to
exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom
of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and condi-
tions of employment.. . . 9
Almost a decade before the passage of this statute, the Supreme
Court had stated:
[Labor unions] were organized out of the necessities of the
situation. A single employee was helpless in dealing with an
employer. He was dependent ordinarily on his daily wage for
the maintenance of himself and family. If the employer re-
fused to pay him the wages that he thought fair, he was
nevertheless unable to leave the employ and to resist arbitrary
and unfair treatment. Union was essential to give laborers
opportunity to deal on equality with their employer.'
Pronouncements of national public policy in favor of collective
bargaining and against individual bargaining can also be found in
the Railway Labor Act,' the National Labor Relations Act° and the
Labor-Management Relations Act.' The concept of individual freedom
of contract as a basis for national labor relations policy was ultimately
rejected when the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
the National Labor Relations Act.° The Act granted labor organizations
designated by a majority of the employees exclusive bargaining rights
for these employees. 9
Resistance to collective bargaining dies hard, however. Since
3
 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1964).
4
 American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209
(1921).
5
 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
0 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964):
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess
full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are
organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially
burdens and affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent busi-
ness depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage
earners in industry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates
and working conditions within and between industries.
7
 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1964).
8
 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). See also United States
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 .(1941); National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350 (1940);
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
9 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
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individual freedom of contract can no longer be validly raised, a new
legal argument has been advanced. Each worker, it is said, has the
right to interpret for himself the collectively negotiated union contract,
and he has the further right to press individually for his interpretation,
either directly with the employer or through the grievance procedure
provisions of the union contract.
This argument substitutes individual freedom of arbitration for
individual freedom of contract, with the same intention and, clearly,
the same end result: a return to the arithmetical notion of equality,
one man-one voice, one employer-one employee, an "equality"
which has no basis in social and economic reality. The argument is
directed toward the abolition of collective bargaining, which in essence
requires not only collective negotiation of contracts, but also collective
arbitration of differences, and a return to the inequities and social
costs of the individual employment agreement.
Interestingly, this retrogressive approach to labor relations is not
found principally in management proposals. In contractual relations
with unions, management prefers to determine the meaning and
application of contracts through dealings with the exclusive, majority-
selected bargaining agent, rather than with a multitude of individuals.
Nor have the courts themselves, for the most part, favored the
doctrine of union contract interpretation by individuals through the
arbitration process. Rather, the new champions of individualism in
labor-management relations are to be found among academicians, few
of whom have had practical experience in collective bargaining." Most
of their contentions can be traced to a spurious libertarianism. The
arguments are structured on a foundation of law, both statutory and
decisional, which leans heavily on the proviso in Section 9(a) of the
National Labor Relations Act."
The National Labor Relations Actu requires employers to
10 Prof. Alfred W. Blumrosen, Rutgers Univ. Law School, The Worker and Three
Phases of Unionism: Administrative and Judicial Control of the Worker-Union Relation-
ship, 61 Mich. L. Rev. 1435 (1963); Blumrosen, Legal Protection for Critical Job
Interests: Union-Management Authority Versus Employee Autonomy, 13 Rutgers L.
Rev. 631 (1959); Prof. Sanford J. Rosen, Univ. of Md. Law School, The Individual
Worker in Grievance Arbitration: Still Another Look at the Problem, 24 Md. L. Rev.
233 (1964); Prof. Clyde W. Summers, Yale Law School, Individual Rights in Collective
Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 362 (1962); Prof. Harry H. Wellington,
Yak Law School, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility In
A Federal System, 67 Yale L.J. 1327 (1958). But cf. Prof. Benjamin Aaron, Inst. of
Ind. Rel., Univ. of Cal., Some Aspects of the Union's Duty of Fair Representation,
22 Ohio St. L.J. 39 (1961); Prof. Archibald Cox, Harv. Law School, The Duty of Fair
Representation, 2 Vill. L. Rev. 151 (1957); Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 1947, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 274, 299 (1948); Prof. Kurt L. Hanslowe, Cornell
Univ., Individual Rights in Collective Labor Relations, 45 Cornell L.Q. 25 (1959).
11 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § I59(a) (1964).
12 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
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bargain with the bargaining representative selected by a majority of
employees in an appropriate unit as "the exclusive representatives of
all the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining."
The original act contained the section 9(a) proviso, however, "that any
individual employee or group of employees shall have the right at any
time to present grievances to their employer." In 1947, this proviso
was amended to read:
[']ily individual employee or group of employees shall have
the right at any time to present grievances to their employer
and to have such grievances adjusted, without the interven-
tion of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjust-
ment is not inconsistent with the terms of the collective
bargaining contract or agreement then in effect; Provided
further, That the bargaining representative has been given
opportunity to be present at such adjustment's
It has been held that this proviso grants individual employees the
right to process their own grievances.' The New Jersey Supreme Court
ruled in the 1963 case of Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 15
 that, as a
matter of federal Iaw, an individual employee has vested rights under
the section 9(a) proviso not only to present his grievance to his em-
ployer but to take his unsettled grievance to arbitration notwithstand-
ing the refusal of his union to do so." Other state courts have made
similar rulings.17
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
in the case of Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machin-
ists," has taken the view that this proviso merely gives the employer
the freedom to consider grievances presented by individual employees;
it does not grant an employee a substantive right requiring the em-
ployer to take up his grievance. The court decided that an employee,
as an individual, had no standing to compel arbitration since the terms
13
 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964).
14 West Tex. Util. Co. v. NLRB, 206 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
855 (1953); Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945); NLRB v. North
Am. Aviation, Inc., 136 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1943).
is 40 N.J. 61, 190 A.2d 825 (1963).
16
 For definition of the term "grievances," see, e.g., Lapp, How to Handle Labor
Grievances (1945); Katz, Minimizing Disputes Through the Adjustment of Grievances,
12 Law & Contemp. Prob. 249 (1947); Weiss & Hussey, Grievance Procedure Under
Collective Bargaining, 63 Monthly Lab. Rev. 175 (1946); U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Dep't of Labor, Bull. No. 1425-1, Major Collective Bargaining Agreements: Grievance
Procedures 5-15 (1964).
17
 Gilden v. Singer Mfg. Co., 145 Conn. 117, 139 A.2d 611 (1958); Clark v. Hein-
Werner Corp., 8 Wis. 2d 264, 99 N.W.2d 132 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 962 (1960);
Pattenge v. Wagner Iron Works, 275 Wis. 495, 82 N.W.2d 172 (1957).
18
 313 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1961), cited with approval by the Supreme Court in
Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
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of the applicable agreement limited arbitration to the union and the
employer. The court stated that the section 9(a) proviso did not con-
fer upon individual employees the power to compel an employer to
entertain the grievance or channel it through the arbitration process:
Our conclusion is dictated not merely by the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement and by the language, struc-
ture, and history of section 9(a), but also by what we con-
sider to be a sound view of labor-management relations. The
union representS the employees for the purposes of negoti-
ating and enforcing the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement. This is the modern means of bringing about indus-
trial peace and channeling the resolution of intra-plant dis-
putes. Chaos would result if every disenchanted employee,
every disturbed employee, and every employee who harbored
a dislike for his employer, could harass both the union and
the employer by processing grievances through the various
steps of the grievance procedure and ultimately by bringing
an action to compel arbitration in the face of clear contrac-
tual provisions intended to channel the enforcement remedy
through the union.' 9
Other courts have agreed that a union member could not avail
himself of the contract arbitration procedure or maintain an action
against the employer to vindicate his rights under the agreement
where the union declined to place the claim in arbitration. 2° Addition-
ally the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board be-
lieves that the section 9(a) proviso was passed to afford employers the
freedom to confer with employees on grievances without the interven-
tion of the bargaining agent, and that it was not intended to require
employers to meet with individuals. 21
 The view that individual em-
ployees who are represented by an exclusive bargaining agent have
the right to process their own grievances to and through final and
binding arbitration is destructive. It can destroy voluntary labor
19 Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, supra note 18, at 186.
2° Broniman v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 353 F.2d 559 (6th Cir. 1965) ; Procter
& Gamble Independent Union v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 312 F,2d 181 (2d Cir.
1962); Palnau v. Detroit Edison Co., 301 F.2d 702 (6th Cir. 1962); Ostrofsky v. United
Steelworkers, 171 F. Supp. 782 (1959), aff'd, 273 F.2d 614, cert. denied, 363 U.S. 849
(1960) ; Arsenault v. General Elec. Co., 147 Conn. 130, 157 A.2d 918, cert. denied, 364
U.S. 815 (1960); In re Soto, 7 N.Y.2d 397, 165 N.E.2d 855, 198 N.Y.S.2d 282 (1960);
Parker v. Borock, 5 N.Y.2d 156, 182 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1959).
21 See Cox, Rights Under A Labor Agreement, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 601, 624 (1456):
[T]he internal evidence argues rather more strongly that the only effect of the
proviso is to make it plain that the employer's duty to bargain exclusively with
the representative designated by a majority of the employees is not violated if
he chooses to receive grievances from individuals.
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arbitration, undermine collective bargaining and endanger industrial
peace.
Arbitration provisions in labor agreements are not enforceable
under the common law or under the statutes of most states.' The
applicability of the Federal Arbitration Act to labor contracts is in
substantial doubt." Until 1957, when the Textile Workers v. Lincoln
Mills case was decided by the Supreme Court," employers as well as
unions' were free in virtually all jurisdictions to ignore their respective
contractual commitments to arbitrate. Arbitration compacts were gen-
erally unenforceable "gentlemen's agreements," not legally binding
on the parties. 26 Before Lincoln Mills and the Supreme Court's later
arbitration enforcement decisions, sometimes referred to as the Steel-
workers trilogy, 27 an employer was often at liberty to reject a request
for arbitration by the union and always could reject the request of
individual employees to arbitrate.
As a result of the decisions holding that labor arbitration agree-
ments by parties in interstate commerce were binding as a matter of
federal substantive law, management began to reconsider its arbitra-
tion commitments and to restrict and narrow its obligation to arbitrate
contract disputes with the union, since it was no longer free to ca-
priciously ignore arbitration procedures previously agreed upon."
22 Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109 (1924); W. H. Blodgett Co.
v. Bebe Co., 190 Cal. 665, 214 Pac. 38 {1923); 5 C.J. Arbitration & Award 6 (1916) ;
Wyle, Unions in Search of a Forum to Enforce Contracts, 7 Lab. L.J. 425 (1956).
23
 Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 230 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1956), rev'd, 353 U.S.
448 (1957); Signal-Stat Corp. v. United Elec. Radio Workers, 235 F.2d 298 (2d Cir.
1956); Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Teamsters Union, 217 F.2d 49 (6th Cir. 1954);
Tenney Eng'r, Inc. v. United Elec. Radio Workers, 207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1953) ; Street
Elec. Ry. Employees v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 192 F.2d 310 (3d Cir.
1951); Mercury Oil Rep. Co. v. Oil Workers, 187 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1951); Furniture
Workers v. Colonial Hardware Flooring Co., 168 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948) ; Gatliff Coal
Co. v. Cox, 142 F.2d 876 (6th Cir. 1944).
24 Supra note 23.
26
 As a general rule, it is the union which seeks arbitration. In the event of a dispute
over the meaning of the contract, the employer can proceed to act unilaterally subject
to a union challenge either before an arbitrator or in the courts. The union is generally
foreclosed from taking concerted economic action by a no-strike provision in the
agreement.
26 ABA Comm. on Arbitration, Report on Labor Arbitration, 28 Lab. Arb. 913,
929 (1957); Chamberlain, Collective Bargaining and the Concept of Contract, 48 Colum.
L. Rev. 829 (1948); Gregory & Orlikoff, The Enforcement of Labor Arbitration Agree-
ments, 17 U. Chi. L. Rev. 233, 236-41 (1950) ; Howard, Labor-Management Arbitration:
"There Ought to be a Law"—Or Ought There?, 21 Mo. L. Rev. 1, 18-20 (1956); Pirsig,
Some Comments on Arbitration Legislation and the Uniform Act, 10 Vand. L. Rev. 685
(1957) ; Wyle, supra note 22.
27 United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). See also John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
28 O'Connell, American Management Ass'n Conf., 46 L.R.R.M. 57 (1960); Smith,
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Arbitration is, of course, voluntary. Nobody can be compelled to
arbitrate a dispute unless he has first agreed to do so." Most arbitra-
tion provisions in collective bargaining agreements provide for this
remedy only at the instance of a party to the agreement—the employer
or the union." Many employers who accept arbitration as the avenue
for labor dispute settlement during the contract term do so secure in
the knowledge that the union has demonstrated responsibility and will
not plague the employer with meritless claims. In fact, employers rely
upon the union to sift out and reject, through investigation and the
grievance machinery steps preliminary to arbitration, those employee
complaints which lack substance.
Some courts 31 and many commentators' maintain that employers
should be obligated to arbitrate the claims and grievances of individ-
uals which are rejected by the union. If the problem were resolved
in that way, it seems clear that management's movement to restrict or
exclude consensual arbitration as the terminal point for the settlement
of grievances would have been greatly accelerated. Such a trend would
be contrary to the nation's declared public policy." It would eliminate
the only practical method for the peaceful settlement of labor-man-
agement disputes during a contract term. It would cause unions to
reserve the right to strike during the term of a contract which did not
include arbitration, since arbitration is the quid pro quo for the union's
no-strike pledge."
One particularly active champion of the "right-to-arbitrate" pol-
icy has observed that employers will not escape vexation by restricting
the individual employee's arbitral freedom, since they can always re-
cover contract benefits in a plenary action. He argues that preventing
employees from arbitrating claims on their own initiative will only
compel them to turn to the courts, thus causing the employers even
greater annoyance and expense." The recent decision of the Supreme
Court in Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox" shatters that argument.
Report, Eighth Annual Institute on Labor Law of the Southwestern Legal Foundation,
49 L.R.R.M. 48, 52 (1962).
29 Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962). See cases cited note 27 supra.
ao U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 16, at 1. The right of an individual
employee to prosecute his own grievance through the arbitration machinery is un-
questioned where the union and the employer so provide by the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, supra note 18.
31 See cases cited note 17 supra.
32 Blumrosen, Legal Protection for Critical job Interests, supra note 10; Summers,
supra note 10.
33 Labor Management Relations Act, § 203(d), 61 Stat. 154 (1947), as amended,
29 § 173(d) (1964). Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties
is "declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes. . . ."
34
 Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, supra note 23.
35 Summers, supra note 10, at 404 n.169.
36 Supra note 18.
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The Court declared that individual employees cannot bypass their
bargaining agent and the contract grievance procedure to claim rights
under a union agreement in a lawsuit. In fact, the decision resolves
the profuse debate over individual arbitral rights."
Thus, under the present state of the federal law, which is supreme
in this area, individual employees have no right to arbitrate claims
under a union contract. An employer can be confident that his agree-
ment to arbitrate claims arising under the collective bargaining agree-
ment with a union will not lead to individual employee harassment
through private arbitration or suit.
It has been argued that vesting exclusive power in the bargaining
agent to prosecute the contract rights of individuals imposes too much
authority in a union and subjects the individual's rights to possible
union discrimination, indifference or indolence, or to the vagaries of
union politics. A delicate balance exists between the rights of an indi-
vidual member of any group and the welfare of the majority of its
members. Unions strive to maintain this equilibrium in a complex
situation, for the role of the bargaining agent involves more than nego-
tiating the original agreement. A contracting union must be sensitive
to the changes and developments in the industrial process, in the
economy of the industry and in the work force itself. It must keep
abreast of changes made through collective bargaining in other indus-
tries, as well as of new laws affecting employees and the relationship
with the employer. As a corollary, it must be prepared to engage in
collective bargaining during the period of a contract to seek changes
in the agreement, when warranted by changes in circumstances. Such
changes might affect adversely the rights or benefits of certain em-
ployees as fixed by the original agreement.
This was the case in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman." The union en-
tered into a supplemental agreement during the term of the original
agreement, granting seniority credit to employees for their time in
military service. Inevitably, the relative seniority of other employees
under the original agreement was reduced. The Supreme Court upheld
the authority of the union to exercise its judgment and discretion in
renegotiating the provisions of the existing agreement with the em-
ployer.
Unions are free to negotiate changes in existing collective agree-
ments, if this is done in good faith, for an honest purpose. Employee
rights and benefits provided by agreement are therefore not necessarily
vested for the term of the agreement. They may be altered through
subsequent negotiations due to changed conditions or, as sometimes
37 See pp. 795-97 infra,
38 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
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happens, through the disclosure of an unintended result in the process-
ing of an employee grievance. For example, it may be revealed during
a grievance session that a loose incentive system has developed a run-
away wage rate, far beyond that which even the union considers rea-
sonable.
Mr. Justice Goldberg, a labor attorney of vast experience before
his accession to the bench, in a concurring opinion in Humphrey v.
Moore,3° pointed out:
The parties are free by joint action to modify, amend, and
supplement their original collective bargaining agreement.
They are equally free, since " [T]he grievance procedure is
. . . a part of the continuous collective bargaining process"
to settle grievances not falling within the scope of the con-
tract. . . In this case, for example, had the dispute gone to
arbitration, the arbitrator would have been bound to apply
the existing agreement and to determine whether the merger-
absorption clause applied. However, even in the absence of
such a clause, the contracting parties—the multiemployee
unit and the union—were free to resolve the dispute by
amending the contract to dovetail seniority lists or to achieve
the same result by entering into a grievance settlement. The
presence of the merger-absorption clause did not restrict the
right of the parties to resolve their dispute by joint agree-
ment applying, interpreting, or amending the contract. There
are too many unforeseeable contingencies in a collective bar-
gaining relationship to justify making the words of the con-
tract the exclusive source of rights and duties.
It is well settled that an employer violates the National Labor
Relations Act if he negotiates directly with his employees where there
is a recognized union," and that individual contracts of employment
are superseded by the collective bargaining agreement." To hold
otherwise would obviously upset the collective bargaining process.
There is little difference, however, between an employer's making a
separate agreement with an employee, providing different benefits
from those contained in the collective agreement, and the employer's
inducing an employee to accept different benefits through the grievance
procedure. In each case, the bargaining agent is bypassed, and the
collective agreement is undercut. The NLRB and the courts have rec-
39
 375 U.S. 335, 353-54 (1964).
40 J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
41
 Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944). See also Order of
R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342 (1944) ; National Licorice
Co. v. NLRB, supra note 8.
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ognized this similarity and have barred attempts to negotiate terms
and conditions of employment with individual employees or groups of
employees under the guise of settling grievances. 42 It is erroneous to
view grievance adjustment as anything less than the continuation of
collective bargaining or to attempt to distinguish between the two:
grievance adjustment is an integral part of the collective bargaining
process. As the NLRB has noted, "there is no distinct cleavage between
collective bargaining and the settlement of grievances, whether indi-
vidual or group.""
The primary objective of a union is to obtain the best conditions
of employment for as many employees in the bargaining unit as possi-
ble and then to enforce these benefits. It is unrealistic to expect that
each employee represented, including the "disenchanted" and the "dis-
turbed," will be satisfied at all times." Not infrequently, situations
occur where a conflict of interest develops between two or more groups
of employees represented by the union. The union must then make a
decision in support of one group or the other' before determining
whether the employer's decision should be challenged under the griev-
ance adjustment machinery. One can conceive of many situations in
which a union might reject, for reasons other than the merits of the
case, an employee's request to submit his grievance to arbitration. Per-
haps the grievance involves a trifling point or a petty sum not worth
the time and money required to prosecute the claim. Or the grievance
may, if won, establish an undesirable precedent, or affect adversely
the equities of a large number of employees.
In such cases, the justice of the individual grievance is not the de-
termining factor in the union's decision. In fact, in a recent case involv-
ing the Union News Company, which made its way to the United
States Supreme Court," blameless employees suffered an obvious in-
justice to which the union nevertheless acquiesced in order to protect
the collective interest. In this case the employer, who operated a res-
taurant, found that profits were lagging behind expectations and sus-
pected that funds or goods were being stolen or mishandled by some
of its dozen or so employees in that place of business. In discussions
with the union, the employer proposed discharging all the employees,
a plan to which the union objected. After lengthy negotiations, it was
42
 West Tex. Util. Co. v. NLRB, supra note 14; Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147
F.2d 69, 72, 73 (5th Cir. 1945); NLRB v. North Am. Aviation inc., supra note 14.
Contra, Douds v. Local 1250, 173 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1949).
4a North Am. Aviation, Inc., 44 N.L.R.B. 604, 611 (1942), enforced, 136 F.2d 898 (9th
Cir. 1943),
44
 Black-Clawson Co. v. international Ass'n of Machinists, supra note 18, at 186.
45 See, e.g., Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
45
 Simmons v. Union News Co., 341 F.2d 531 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 884
(1965).
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agreed to lay off five employees for a two-week period; if the company's
profits improved significantly during this period, the five employees
would not be recalled to work. Profits did increase during the period,
whereupon the five employees were permanently discharged in accor-
dance with the employer's agreement with the union.
Two of the five employees protested vigorously, demanding that
the union seek their reinstatement via the grievance and arbitration
process. The union refused to do so, and the employer rejected direct
negotiations with these employees. The employees then brought an
action contending that they were not discharged for "just cause" as
required by the collective bargaining agreement. The suit was dis-
missed on the ground that the agreement between the employer and the
union as to "just cause" for the discharges was not subject to challenge
by the affected employees.
The decision in this case illustrates the most essential precondition
to effective collective bargaining. An individual employee should not
be permitted to challenge or overrule a decision of his collective bar-
gaining representative with respect to matters relating to wages, hours
or conditions of employment, or reaching the interpretation, application
or breach of a collective bargaining agreement by action under the
agreement, notwithstanding possible lack of justification for the union's
position. In such areas, which involve joint union-management deal-
ings and determinations, only the bargaining agent acting in the col-
lective interest should confer and reach decisions with the employer.
Only the union should pursue remedies which can lead to final reso-
lution of such issues. Professor Archibald Cox of the Harvard Law
School expressed the same view in these words:
Unless a contrary intention is manifest, the employer's obli-
• gations under a collective bargaining agreement which con-
tains a grievance procedure controlled by the union shall
be deemed to run solely to the union as the bargaining repre-
sentative, to be administered by the union in accordance with
its fiduciary duties to employees in the bargaining unit. The
representative can enforce the claim. It can make reasonable,
binding compromises. It is liable for breaches of trust in a
suit by the employee beneficiaries.47
Nor should an individual employee be permitted to pursue
through arbitration a contract interpretation contention which his union
rejects. Although such action may benefit the specific employee, it may
harm other employees, undermine the bargaining agent, disregard the
group interest or disturb a good relationship with management. The
47 Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 601, 618 (1956).
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law does not review the fairness of the substantive terms of the nego-
tiated contract. It does not question the results of a good faith change
in the contract during its term, 48 nor does it allow the agreement of
the contracting parties as to the meaning or application of the contract
to be subject to challenge by individual employees through recourse to
the arbitral machinery. Arbitration procedures are negotiated to pro-
vide machinery for disputes between the contracting parties as to the
meaning of the contract. Arbitration is not established as a court of
equity to administer justice to individual complainants.
The decision in Humphrey v. Moore" has been read as a pro-
nouncement by our highest court that individual employees may ques-
tion the determination reached by their bargaining representative and
their employer as to the meaning of the collective agreement. It has
further been contended that the decision upholds the employees' free-
dom to participate in the grievance and arbitration process separate
from the representation provided and to take a position different from
that of the contracting union." The case arose out of a situation in
which one employer absorbed the operations and the employees of
another. Both groups of employees were represented by the same
union and were covered by the same multi-employer, multi-local union
collective contract. The seniority standing of the employees became
vital since there would be some loss of jobs as a result of the merger.
The seniority issue reached a joint conference committee which, under
the grievance provisions, consisted of an equal number of union and
employer representatives. This committee decided that the seniority
lists of both employers should be dovetailed. Since the employer who
was discontinuing operations had been in business longer, its employees
had accumulated more seniority. Some of the employees of the con-
tinuing employer were therefore threatened with lay-off when both
groups of employees were merged.
The threatened employees brought an action to enjoin the decision
of the joint conference committee. The Supreme Court held the action
to be a proper one, although it denied relief. A tenable conclusion is
that the Court upheld the right of individual employees to challenge
a union-employer decision made under the grievance procedure, pro-
vided that the members of the joint conference committee were in fact
the employer and union representatives. But, as Mr. Justice Harlan
noted in his concurring opinion, the joint conference committee did
not constitute the contracting parties; it was an arbitration board
limited in its power to the settlement of disputes within the scope of
48 Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, supra note 38.
49 Supra note 45.
88
 ibid.; ABA, Sec. of Labor Rel. Law, 1964 Proceedings, Report of Committee on
Labor Arbitration; Reiss, N.Y.U. 18th Annual Labor Conference (1965).
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its authority under the agreement." The prevailing opinion, written
by Mr. Justice White, also considered whether the committee exceeded
the powers conferred upon it by the parties. It did not decide that the
contracting parties could not legally have conferred such powers upon
the committee nor exercised these powers itself." In short, Humphrey
did not hold that a union cannot settle a grievance by an agreement
made in good faith with the employer without also having the approval
of the affected employees. It merely ruled that the court will entertain
the conventional suit to set aside an arbitration award if it is alleged
that the arbitrator exceeded his authority under the terms of the agree-
ment."
The subsequent Supreme Court decision in Republic Steel Corp.
v. Maddox' establishes beyond doubt that Humphrey is not authority
for the proposition that individual employees may prosecute contract
claims separately from their bargaining representative. In the Maddox
case, the court decided that an individual employee cannot ignore the
grievance and arbitration procedure of a collective bargaining agree-
ment, as well as the union's role in such grievance adjustment ma-
chinery, by suing for severance pay allegedly due under the terms of
the contract. It stated:
As a general rule in cases to which federal law applies,
federal labor policy requires that individual employees wish-
ing to assert contract grievances must attempt use of the con-
tract grievance procedure agreed upon by employer and
union as the mode of redress. If the union refuses to press or
only perfunctorily presses the individual's claim, differences
may arise as to the forms of redress then available. See Hum-
phrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335; Labor Board v. Miranda Fuel
Co., 326 F.2d 172. But unless the contract provides other-
wise, there can be no doubt that the employee must afford the
union the opportunity to act on his behalf. Congress has ex-
pressly approved contract grievance procedures as a prefer-
red method for settling disputes and stabilizing the "common
law" of the plant. LMRA § 203 (d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d); §
201(c), 29 U.S.C. § 171(c) (1958 Ed.). Union interest in
prosecuting employee grievances is clear. Such activity com-
51 375 U.S. at 359. A joint labor-management committee decision rendered pursuant
to the grievance adjustment machinery of the contract, if binding on the parties, is
enforceable in the same fashion as an arbitration award. General Drivers v. Riss & Co.,
372 U.S. 517 (1963).
52 375 U.S. at 342, 345.
53 See Drake Bakeries Inc. v. Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254 (1962); Atkinson v.
Sinclair Ref. Co., supra note 29; cases cited note 27 supra; Potoker v. Brooklyn Eagle,
Inc., 2 N.Y.2d 553, 141 N.E.2d 841, 161 N.Y.S.2d 609 (1957).
54 Supra note 18.
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plements the union's status as exclusive bargaining represen-
tative by permitting it to participate actively in the
continuing administration of the contract. In addition, con-
scientious handling of grievance claims will enhance the
union's prestige with employees. Employer interests, for their
part, are served by limiting the choice of remedies available
to aggrieved employees. And it cannot be said, in the normal
situation, that contract grievance procedures are inadequate
to protect the interests of an aggrieved employee until the
employee has attempted to implement the procedures and
found them so.
A contrary rule which would permit an individual em-
ployee to completely sidestep available grievance procedures
in favor of a law suit has little to commend it. In addition to
cutting across the interests already mentioned, it would de-
prive employer and union of the ability to establish a uniform
and exclusive method for orderly settlement of employee
grievances. If a grievance procedure cannot be made exclu-
sive, it loses much of its desirability as a method of settle-
ment. A rule creating such a situation "would inevitably exert
a disruptive influence upon both the negotiation and admin-
istration of collective agreements." Teamsters Local v. Lucas
Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103.55
Thus, relief is denied because the employee has no individual standing
to enforce rights created by the collective bargaining contract.
The case of Smith v. Evening News Ass'n," decided two years
earlier, does not conflict with this ruling. It is true that, in Smith, in-
dividual employees sued to vindicate rights under a collective bargain-
ing agreement, and the Court sustained the action. But the agreement
in that case did not include provisions making arbitration for the ad-
justment of grievances possible. The majority opinion significantly
recorded in a footnote that the Court did not consider the standing of
the petitioner to sue or the standing of other employees generally to
sue for contract breaches in that case since this point was not raised
by the proceedings.'
To the extent that Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley 58
 is in disagree-
ment, it is apparently overruled sub silentio. That case, decided five to
four in 1945, involved employee rights under the Railway Labor Act'
which expressly permits individuals to sue to enforce awards and sets
55
 Id. at 652-53.
56
 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
57
 Id. at 20 n.9.
58
 325 U.S. 711 (1945), aff'd on rehearing, 327 U.S. 661 (1946).
59
 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
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procedures for settling individual grievance disputes." Comparable
provisions are not found in the National Labor Relations Act.'" The
Court held that the bargaining agent did not have the authority to
compromise individual employee rights which had accrued under a
collective bargaining agreement.
The Maddox case" appears to adopt the reasoning in Black-
Clawson v. International Assn of Machinists" that, under collective
bargaining agreements, employees have no individual rights which they
can enforce against their employer, except through their recognized
union. This proposition of law, which provides the only foundation
for preserving the system of collective bargaining, implies a certain
relationship between an individual union member and the majority of
members of the union, such that grievances should be settled in the
interest of the majority, not the individual. Individuals have only such
rights as the majority is prepared to support before, during and after
contract negotiations.
Equating the union with the majority of its members reflects both
its origin and the basis of its operation. The union is created by the
majority of workers in a unit, who vote to be represented by it in col-
lective bargaining, and the union's authority derives from the con-
tinued support of the majority, whose interests, rather than those of
any single individual, it represents. The reality of numbers further
supports the position that an individual may not challenge a union
decision in grievance procedures. If a collective bargaining agreement
provided strike freedom in lieu of arbitration in the event of a dispute,
the union would be free to determine whether to call a strike to attain
a satisfactory settlement of an individual employee's grievance. In-
dividual employees do not have this power to call a stoppage each
time that they feel aggrieved. Similarly, they should have no right to
invoke arbitration, the substitute for the strike.
Individual employee pursuit of employment benefits to a final
determination without the acquiescence of the bargaining agent is the
equivalent of individual bargaining and individual employment con-
tracts. To permit a procedure for individual adjustments is to move
backward in bargaining practices and in economic conditions, and to
discourage employers and unions from continuing to dispose of griev-
ances peacefully through arbitration, a major factor in achieving in-
dustrial peace."
60 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 152 Fourth (1964); 44 Stat. 578
(1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (1964).
61 49 Stat. 449 (1955), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
62 Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, supra note 18.
63 Supra note 18.
64 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., supra note 27, at 582.
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Collective bargaining and individual bargaining cannot exist side
by side. Once the majority has chosen concerted bargaining, each
employee must depend upon the benefits and advantages that accrue
to him as a group member. It is not feasible for employees to be bound
by majority decision only when it is satisfactory to them and to permit
them to go their own way whenever the group or union decision is not
in their individual interest, The Supreme Court noted many years
ago that:
The workman is free, if he values his own bargaining position
more than that of the group, to vote against representation;
but the majority rules, and if it collectivizes the employment
bargain, individual advantages or favors will generally in
practice go in as a contribution to the collective result."
The individual is not deprived of recourse if the union fails to exer-
cise properly its fiduciary obligation to the employees it represents.
It is firmly established under both the National Labor Relations and
Railway Labor Acts that a union must act honestly, in good faith
and without discrimination in the exercise of its exclusive authority to
enforce both collective and individual rights under the bargaining
agreement."
The leading case of Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., decided in
1944, involved a Negro locomotive fireman who sued to restrain his
union and his employer from making an agreement which discriminated
against employees of his race. Chief Justice Stone, writing for the
Court, spelled out the majority union's collective bargaining obliga-
tions to the individual employee as follows:
. . . we think that Congress, in enacting the Railway Labor
Act and authorizing a labor union, chosen by a majority of a
craft, to represent the craft, did not intend to confer plenary
power upon the union to sacrifice, for the benefit of its mem-
bers, rights of the minority of the craft, without imposing on
it any duty to protect the minority. . . .
This does not mean that the statutory representative of
a craft is barred from making contracts which may have un-
favorable effects on some of the members of the craft repre-
sented. Variations in the terms of the contract based on dif-
ferences ... in seniority, the type of work performed, the
65 J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, supra note 40, at 339.
66
 Syres v. Oil Workers, 350 U.S. 892 (1956), reversing 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir.
1955) ; Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952) ; Wallace Corp.
v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944) ; Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S.
210 (1944) ; Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) ; Hughes Tool Co. v.
NLRB, 147 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945).
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competence and skill with which it is performed, are within the
scope of the bargaining representation of a craft, all of
whose members are not identical in their interest or merit.
Cf. Carmichael v: Southern Coal Co., 301 U.S. 495, 509-510,
512 and cases cited; Washington v. Superior Court, 289 U.S.
361, 366; Metropolitan Casualty Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S.
580, 583. Without attempting to mark' the allowable limits of
differences in the terms of contracts based on differences of
conditions to which they apply, it is enough for present pur-
poses to say that the statutory power to represent a craft
and to make contracts as to wages, hours and working con-
ditions does not include the authority to make among mem-
bers of the craft discriminations not based on such relevant
differences. Here the discriminations based on race alone
are obviously irrelevant and invidious."
Since both contract negotiation and grievance settlement are
modes of obtaining employee benefits, discriminatory treatment of
minority races in the processing of grievances, as well as in the nego-
tiation of a contract, constitutes a breach of a union's duty to represent
fairly all the employees for whom it is authorized to act as statutory
agent." This duty of fair representation is also applicable to employees
who receive disparate treatment for reasons other than race bias."
Accordingly, a judicial remedy is available to the employee whose
union has failed for invidious, capricious or arbitrary reasons to pur-
sue a valid grievance. The employee may not be able to sue his em-
ployer or arbitrate a claim he may have under the collective agreement,
but he has a cause of action against the union if its failure to support
his claim is not honestly motivated. As the Maryland Court observed
in Jenkins v. Wm. Schluderberg-T. J. Kurdle Co.:
Conflicts of interest may exist or develop in many instances
in grievance matters as between individuals or groups of em-
ployees represented by the same bargaining agent. It seems
desirable that the bargaining agent should have power to
deal with such problems. It is possible that even the discharge
of a single individual might have wide repercussions in em-
ployer-employee relations, though usually this would not
seem probable.
87
 Id. at 199, 203.
68
 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
00
 Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, supra note 66; Ostrofsky v. United Steelworkers, supra
note 20; Jenkins v. Wm. Schluderberg-T.J. Kurdle Co., 217 Md. 556, 144 A.2d 88 (1958) ;
Cortez v. FOrd Motor Co., 349 Mich. 108, 84 N.W.2d 523 (1957); DiSanti v. Corning
Glass Works, 9 D. & C.2d 611 (Pa. Corn. Pleas 1956).
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Possibilities of indifference, favoritism, discrimination
and of trading off the interests of one group or member for
the benefit of another group or member, of course, exist. Yet,
possibilities of abuse of trust and confidence exist, in many
fields. Through the law of trusts and of fiduciary or confiden-
tial relations, protections against such possible abuses have
been developed in many situations. The law does not in such
matters strike down discretionary powers conferred upon
trustees merely because such powers might be abused. .. .
Courts will redress misuse of power."
The AFL-CIO "accepts the proposition that a labor organization
serving as exclusive bargaining agent has a duty to represent all the
employees in the bargaining unit fairly and impartially. This duty has
been enforced by the courts, and the Federation does not quarrel with
the decisions upholding judicial enforceability!"71 In addition, the
NLRB has ruled that it will rescind the certification of a labor orga-
nization as the exclusive bargaining representative upon evidence that
the union is not fairly representing all of the employees in the bar-
gaining unit." In the Pioneer Bus Co. case, the Board also declared
that it will not bar an election for representation on the petition by a
rival union where the incumbent union is a party to a discriminatory
agreement, notwithstanding its general contract bar rule protecting
a contracting union from rival union raids for the duration of the
reasonable term of a complete written agreement."
Recently, the Board has endeavored to turn the full force of its
remedial powers against labor organizations acting in a manner which
it regards as unfair, invidious or irrelevant toward employees in the
bargaining unit. For the first time, it is interpreting certain unfair
labor practice provisions of the National Labor Relations Act (sec-
tions 8(b) (1) (A), (2), (3)) as prohibiting discriminatory union con-
duct unrelated to union activity."
In its first unfair representation, unfair labor practice case,
7° Supra note 69, at 574-75, 144 A.2d at 98.
71 AFL
-CIO, Amicus Curiae Brief, P-2, NLRB V. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172
(2d Cir. 1963),
72 Independent Metal Workers (Hughes Tool Co.), 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964);
Pioneer Bus Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 54 (1962) ; A. 0. Smith Corp., 119 N.L.R.B. 621 (1957) ;
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 1210 (1955); Hughes Tool Co., 104 N.L.R.B.
318 (1953); Larus & Brother Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 1075 (1945).
73
 Pioneer Bus Co., supra note 72.
74
 Rubber Workers, 57 L.R.R.M. 1535 (1964); Maremount Corp., 149 N.L.R.B.
48 (1964) ; Tanner Motor Livery, 148 N.L.R.B. 1402 (1964) ; Galveston Maritime Assn,
148 N.L.R.B. 897 (1964); Independent Metal Workers (Hughes Tool Co.), supra note
72; Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d
Cir. 1963).
800
EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATION
Miranda Fuel Co., the three to two decision of the Board was denied
enforcement by the Second Circuit. The Board majority has declared,
however, that it will continue to find unfair representation by unions
to be unfair labor practices until the Supreme Court rules to the con-
trary." It is doubtful that the determination by a bare majority of the
Board to suddenly enlarge its section 8 jurisdiction to embrace race
and other alleged forms of discrimination by labor organizations will
be sustained in the courts."
Efforts to convert the NLRB into an agency to protect civil rights
may succeed only in weakening the processes of collective bargaining,
to the detriment of laboring men and women of all colors and creeds.
Congress has established specific machinery to combat discrimination
on the basis of race or color by employers or unions. Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964" created an Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, effective July 1965, to process charges of discriminatory
practices against employers and unions.
The most effective remedy available to an employee who con-
siders himself to be mistreated by a union is generally overlooked by
the courts and by commentators. Discussions of the problem often
contain references to the alleged arbitrary, dishonest or apathetic
conduct of the "union" in the handling of an employee grievance. The
"union" usually proves to be a shop committeeman, steward, local
union officer or business agent. The acts, decisions and conduct of such
minor union officials are virtually always subject to review by a union
body composed of the union's executive board or the local union mem-
bership. Further appeals are usually provided to the international
union's officers or governing board, and finally to the international
union convention." Some unions, notably the UAW and the Uphol-
sterers' International Union, have established outside public boards
with authority to review and reverse union action against members."
Capricious, invidious and personal considerations on the part of a
union representative can thus be exposed and corrected. On the other
hand, if a decision is considered by a governing body of a union or
by the membership itself to be sound and in the group's interest, that
decision should be accepted by the member, if rendered in accordance
75 Galveston Maritime Ass'n, supra note 74.
75
 Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965); NLRB v. Miranda Fuel
Co., supra note 71. See dissenting opinions of Chairman McCulloch & Member Fanning
in Miranda Fuel Co., supra note 74, and Independent Metal Workers, supra note 72.
Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 Viii. L. Rev. 151 (1957); Sovern, The National
Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 Colum. L. Rev. 563 (1962).
77 78 Stat. 263 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964); see Symposium, 7 B.C. Ind. &
Corn. L. Rev. 413 (1966).
78 See, e.g., UAW Public Review Board; Its First Year, 42 L.R.R.M. 75 (1958).
79 Taft, The Structure and Government of Labor Unions 124-80 (1956).
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with the principles of due process and the union's governing pro-
cedures.
Access to the union's internal appeals procedure presupposes that
the employee is a union member. The non-member—in a bargaining
unit not covered by a union shop—does not have access to this pro-
cedure. But such a situation demonstrates further that collective bar-
gaining through a labor organization is a form of industrial democracy
in which employees participate only to the extent that they become
citizens by joining the union and paying their share of the costs of
government. Unless they do so, they. forego not only appeals from
union decisions, but also a voice in determining issues which are basic
in their employment relations. Issues such as union demands for con-
tract terms, strike action and the processing of particular employee
grievances, are decided in the councils of the union, not within the
ranks of the bargaining unit as such.
In any community of men, some individual will occasionally suf-
fer as a result of the pursuance of the group interest: the childless
couple pays school taxes; the innocent person languishes in jail over-
night because bail was not raised until morning; the crewman stands
aside as the lifeboat of a sinking ship is filled with passengers. In
the industrial field, an employee may lose his job because of retrench-
ment due to increased labor costs or higher productivity. Male em-
ployees sustain a relative loss in seniority when female employees
doing the same work are integrated into the seniority list. Absolute
justice, satisfaction and equity for each individual will never be at-
tained, for, as the late President John F. Kennedy observed:
[T]here is always inequity in life. Some men are killed in
a war and some men are wounded, and some men never leave
the country. . . . It's very hard in military or in personal life
to assure complete equality. Life is unfair.'
The function of collective bargaining is not to obtain utopian
justice for each individual employee. Its purpose is to improve the con-
ditions of labor of the group that it represents. The function of arbi-
tration machinery is not to dispense equity to each individual em-
ployee, but to resolve disputes between the employer and the union
during a contract term without a strike. Individual claims arising out
of the group action must be subject to the acceptance and support of
the group.
To convert the arbitration process into a forum for hearing the
complaints of individual employees would discourage employers and
80 The President's News Conference of March 21, 1962, reported in Public Papers
of the Presidents—John F. Kennedy 254 (1963).
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unions from continuing to treat differences and disputes through arbi-
tration. To allow individuals to make private settlements or pursue
private interests in arbitration without the approval of the union,
which is the guardian of the collective interest, would undermine col-
lective bargaining, encourage the return of the individual employment
contract and turn back the clock.
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